Tariff and Equilibrium Indeterminacy by Zhang, Yan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Tariff and Equilibrium Indeterminacy
Yan Zhang
New York University, Shanghai Jiaotong University
November 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11370/
MPRA Paper No. 11370, posted 5. November 2008 01:42 UTC
Tari¤ and Equilibrium Indeterminacy
Yan Zhang
School of Economics
Antai College of Economics and Management
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
November 4, 2008
Abstract
We examine the role of tari¤s levied on the imported production factor in a one-sector small
open economy real business cycle model. We show that under perfect competition and con-
stant returns-to-scale, the model may exhibit local indeterminacy and sunspots as tari¤ rates are
endogenously determined by a balanced-budget rule with a constant level of government expen-
ditures. Conversely, the economy in which the government nances endogenous public spending
and transfers with xed tari¤ rates is immune to indeterminacy.
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1. Introduction
Benhabib and Farmer (1999, pp 390) provide ve sources of indeterminacy and sunspots in macro-
economics.
"Sunspots cannot occur in nite general equilibrium models with complete markets
since their existence would violate the rst welfare theorem; risk averse agents will gener-
ally prefer an allocation that doesnt uctuate to one that does. Examples of departures
from Arrow-Debreu structure that permit the existence of sunspots include (1) incom-
plete participation in insurance markets as in the OLG model, (2) incomplete markets
due to transactions costs or asymmetric information, (3) increasing returns to scale
in the technology, (4) market imperfections associated with xed costs, entry costs or
external e¤ects, and (5) the use of money as a medium of exchange."
Indeterminacy means that there are an innite number of equilibria, all of which start from
the same initial condition and converge to a unique steady state. Sunspot equilibria, which can be
constructed by randomizing over these (multiple) equilibria, provide an interpretation of Keyness
"animal spirits" hypothesis that economic uctuations are driven by purely extrinsic beliefs. In this
paper, I add to the literatue another mechanism for indeterminacy: tari¤, which is a kind of trade
taxes (or a kind of transaction costs in international trade).
In a one-sector neoclassical growth model with perfectly competitive markets, a constant returns-
to scale technology and factor income taxes, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997, henceforth SGU)
explore the mechanism that gives rise to indeterminacy and show that the model can exhibit in-
determinacy if taxes rates are endogenously determined by a balanced budget rule with a pre-set
level of government expenditures. The labor market e¤ects in their model are quite similar to those
of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). That is to say, the labor demand curves are upward sloping and
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more steeper than the labor supply curves. Guo and Harrison (2004, henceforth GH) further show
that indeterminacy disappears once the goverment nances endogenous public spending and trans-
fers with xed income tax rates. And they illustrate that SGUs indeterminacy result depends on a
balanced-budget requirement whereby the tax rate decreases with the households taxable income.
The mechanism for indeterminacy in the SGU model is through increases in aggregate employment
that decrease equilibrium tax rates, and raise the after-tax return on labor.
You may ask the question whether tari¤s and factor income taxes (in SGU) deliver indeterminacy
in the same way. This paper gives a positive answer. Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2005, 2006, and 2007
henceforth ACW) extend the Benhabib-Farmer model to an open economy by introducing imported
foreign factors (say oil) as a third production input. They show that reliance on foreign energy has a
potentially important e¤ect on economic activity, because it destabilizes the economy by increasing
the likelihood of indeterminacy, hence making uctuations driven by self-fullling expectations more
likely to occur. Our paper extends Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes analysis to the open economy version
of Benhabib and Farmer model (without productive externalities) by considering a di¤erent balanced-
budget rule whereby constant government expenditures can be nanced by the oil tari¤ revenue.1
Under this type of balanced budget constraint, tari¤ rates are endogenously determined since the
government is forced to lower the tari¤ rates as total output (or tax base) rises. Moreover, we show
that for empirically plausible values of tari¤ rates (or energy taxes), indeterminacy arises in my model
and the economy can exhibit an indeterminate steady state (i.e., a sink). Thus, the endogenously
determined tari¤ rate could be a source of scal increasing returns and share with the labor income
tax rate the similar mechanism for indeterminacy in the standard one sector growth model.2 In
1For simplicity, we assume that the government doesnt impose consumption taxes on the tradable goods or factor
income taxes on the production factors. Adding other taxes changes nothing as long as part of the exogenous spending
must be still nanced by the tari¤ levied on the imported factor. See Velasco (1996) for the same explanation to scal
increasing returns induced by taxes on domestic capital.
2 In the two sector model without scal increasing returns induced by factor income taxes, Bond, Wang and Yip
(1996) and Meng and Velasco (2003) prove that distortionary factor taxation nonetheless causes indeterminacy in a
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addition, this paper shows that if we allow for endogenous public spending and/or transfers nanced
by exogenous tari¤ rates, indeterminacy disappears and the model exhibits saddle-path stability,
reagrdless of the existence of lump-sum transfers.
The literature on trade taxes suggests that the government can raise revenue by using the tari¤
instruments.3 For example, Atolia (2006) considers an open economy model in which public invest-
ment can be nanced by a tari¤ and income tax. Leung (1999) presents an endogenous growth model
in which the tari¤ revenue collected from the imported production factor nances the government
expenditure in a small open economy. The endogeneity of tari¤ rates can be traced to the paper
of Ramsey (1927) and also used by Loewy (2004) and Mourmouras (1991) in a two-country open
economy endogenous growth model and a small open economy OLG model respectively.
The framework that we use in section 2 is a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates
foreign energy as a third production factor. The energy price is assumed to be set in the world markets
and taken as given. Moreover, in our model economy, consumers and rms behave competitively and
a government nances a ow of public spending by using energy tari¤s.4 Miguel and Manzano (2006)
consider a small open economy, in which they assume that the government nances an exogenous
ow of public spending by using consumption and oil taxes (or oil tari¤s) and by issuing debt. Unlike
Miguel and Manzano, under the assumption that government expenditures are constant and labor is
indivisible, we derive the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the balanced budget rule to generate
indeterminacy. It turns out that in order to get indeterminacy, we need the steady state tari¤ rate
to be greater than the share ratio of capital and imported factors in the production function and less
closed-economy, endogenous growth model and a small open RBC model respectively. Does the "channel equivalence"
between factor income taxes and tari¤s to generate indeterminacy still hold in a small open economy two sector model?
This is one issue which deserves our further research.
3The revenue motive behind the imposition of trade taxes is well documented. See, Kindleberger and Lindert (1978,
p. 143), and Riezman and Slemrod (1987).
4The tari¤ revenue in this model can also be interpreted as oil tax revenue. Hence the implication of our model
is not limited to open economies with trade taxes, which means that the main conclusion in this paper also applies
to domestic energy taxes. As in ACW (2005), the foreign input can also be interpreted as non-reproducible natural
resources extracted domestically.
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than a critical value .5
The intuition behind this result is easy to understand. Suppose the proverbial representative agent
expects future tari¤ rates to increase. This implies, for any given stock of capital, future imports
of foreign inputs and the marginal product of capital will be lower. This can lower the current
demand for foreign inputs, thus leading to a fall in total output. Because the tari¤ rate is regressive
with respect to the output (under the balanced budget rule with a pre-set level of government
expenditures), the tari¤ rate today will increase, thus validating the agents initial expectations.
My results suggest that, in general, we should either impose some restrictions on the government
ability to adjust tari¤ rates or reduce the level of tari¤ rates levied on the imported factors in order
to avoid aggregate instability. Consider the current high tari¤ rate which is prevailing in Euro-
pean countries (especially in year 2002). Some countries like Denmark and Netherlands, which are
economies quite dependent on the imported exhaustible natural resources, can be easily pushed into
destabilization.6 I use the ACWs estimation of the imported energy share in the two countries and
nd that the high tari¤ rate on oil in the EU leads the two countries into destabilization. Similarly,
the energy taxes which the EU countries have tried to impose recently also bring the potential dangers
of destabilization into those countries which are economies largely dependent on non-reproducible
resources. Those countries like Denmark and Netherlands should pay close attention to the control
of energy taxes in order to stabilize the economy. As an optimal import tari¤, energy taxes seem to
be very high in these two EU countries (see Newbery (2005)). This implies that indeterminacy can
easily arise in these two countries.
In the policy literature, Maskin and Newbery (1990) show that the optimal open loop tari¤ (the
optimal tari¤ assuming commitment) on oil can induce dynamical inconsistency so that the importer
5The di¤erence is that Miguel and Manzano only allow for exogenous tari¤ rates and therefore indeterminacy cannot
occur in their model.
6Although throughout the paper, we analyze the model for the developed countries, the results also hold for the
less-developed countries which productions are dependent on the imported factors.
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would wish to change the time path of the tari¤ in the midsteam. But Bergstrom (1982) shows
that tari¤s on oil have an attractive property. In his paper, he shows that with international trade
in oil and noncooperative consuming nations, if each nation chooses the optimal ad valorem tari¤,
taking the behaviors of other countries as given, and if suppliers are competitive, then the incidence
of the tari¤s will fall on producers and cause no distortions. Recently, in a small open economy that
imports oil as a third input, Miguel and Manzano (2006) nd that, in general, the government should
not distort the oil price paid by rms with taxes, even when consumption of oil is considered and the
government distinguishes between the taxes paid by the households and the rms. This is because
the optimal tax on intermediate goods (such as oil) should be zero in order to maintain aggregate
production e¢ ciency. My paper represents the same point of view of them from another perspective.
In other words, in order to avoid aggregate instability caused by endogenous tari¤s, the government
should not distort the oil price.
To my knowledge, the papers that study indeterminacy in open economies are Lahiri (2001),
Weder (2001), Meng and Velasco (2004) and ACW (2005, 2006 and 2007). Unlike me, Lahiri, Weder
and Meng and Velasco are concerned with mulptiple equilibria in the economy that uses capital and
labor as inputs. The models of Lahiri and Weder depend on the unrealistic assumption of decreasing
marginal costs to generate indeterminacy. Meng and Velasco analyze the e¤ects of distortionary factor
taxation in generating indeterminacy. ACW (2005, 2006 and 2007) is closer to the present paper
while their model also relies on decreasing marginal costs (or increasing returns) in production. The
mechanism for indeterminacy in my model is through scal increasing returns caused by endogenous
tari¤s.
In sections 3 and 4, we compare our model with Benhabib and Farmer, SGU and ACW models
and nd that (1) the indeterminacy condition in my model has a close correspondence with the one
obtained in the increasing returns model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994); (2) if the imported factor
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is mainly a labor substitute, indeterminacy may not easily arise; and (3) the larger the imported
energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be subject to multiple equilibria. In section
5, we discuss the robustness of our indeterminacy results and in section 6, we conclude the paper.
2. An Economy with Tari¤s
My paper incorporates two di¤erent formulations of the government budget constraints into a modi-
ed small open economy version of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) competitive model without produc-
tion externalities. We assume that labor is indivisible (as in Hansen (1985)) and the only source of
government revenue is a tari¤. In particular, the balanced-budget rule consists of exogenous (and/or
endogenous) government purchases (and/or transfers), and endogenous (and/or exogenous) tari¤
rates levied on the imported input.
2.1. Firms
We introduce government tari¤ policy into the continuous time framework of ACW without pro-
ductive externalities. There is a continuum of identical competitive rms with the total number
normalized to one. The single good is produced by the representative rm with a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = k
ak
t n
an
t o
a0
t , (1)
where yt is total output, kt is the aggregate stock of capital, nt is the aggregate labor supply,
ak+an+a0 = 1 and the third factor in the production, say oil (ot), is imported.7 Perfect competition
in factor and product markets implies that factor demands are given by
7The third inputs can be non-reproducible natural resources.
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wt = an
yt
nt
; (2)
rt +  = ak
yt
kt
, (3)
and
po(1 +  t) = a0
yt
ot
, (4)
where (rt + ) denotes the user cost of renting capital, wt denotes the real wage, po denotes the real
price of oil (the imported goods) and  t is the tari¤ rate levied on the imported oil and uniform to all
rms.8 Here we should emphasize that (1) po is the relative price of the foreign input in terms of the
single good, which is the numeraire and tradable; and (2) the variable  t represents the endogenous
and/or exogenous tari¤ rate levied on the foreign input and we require that  t  0 to rule out the
existence of import subsidies.9
Since we assume that the economy is open to importing energy (oil), the agent can use the
tradable good to buy the foreign input. The energy price is assumed to be exogenous and the foreign
input is assumed to be perfectly elastically supplied.10 These imply that the energy price, po, is
independent of the factor demand for ot. Hence by substituting out ot in the production function
using ot = a0
yt
po(1+ t)
, we can obtain the following reduced-form production function
yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t . (5)
Here the term At = ( a0p0(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 acts as the "technology coe¢ cient" in a neoclassical growth model,
8 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital and rt is the rental rate of capital.
9 If tari¤ rates are exogenous,  t =  holds for all t.
10The model is based on the standard DSGE models that incorporate foreign energy as a third production factor.
This class of models have been used widely to study the business-cycle e¤ects of oil price shocks. This literature includes
Finn (2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Wei (2003), ACW (2005, 2006, and 2007).
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which is inversely related to the foreign factor price and  t. In this reduced-form production function,
the "e¤ective returns to scale" is measured by
ak + an
1  a0 = 1. (6)
2.2. Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical innitely-lived households, each endowed
with one unit of time and maximizes the intertemporal utility function
Z 1
0
e t(log ct   bnt)dt, b > 0, (7)
where ct and nt are the individual households consumption and hours worked, and  2 (0; 1) is the
subjective discount rate. We assume that there are no intrinsic uncertainties present in the model.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is given by
:
kt = rtkt + wtnt   ct + Tt, k0 > 0 given, (8)
where
:
kt denotes net investment and Tt  0 is the lump-sum transfers.
The rst order conditions for the households problem are
1
ct
= t, (9)
b = twt, (10)
9
:
t = (  rt)t, (11)
where t denotes the marginal utility of income.
2.3. Government
The government in my model chooses the tari¤/transfer policy f t; Ttg, and balances its budget in
each period. At each point in time, the budget constraint of the government can be stated as follows
po tot =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
= Gt + Tt, (12)
where Gt  0 represents government expenditures. Finally, market clearing requires that aggregate
demand equal aggregate supply
ct +Gt +
:
kt + kt + otp
o = yt. (13)
Note that the international trade balance is always zero. Foreigners are paid in goods. This is
clear in the above equation, according to which domestic production is divided between consumption,
investment, imports and government expenditures (ct +it +poot + Gt = yt, it =
:
kt + kt). So part
of what is produced domestically is used to pay for the imports. This is the interpretation of Finn
(2000), Wei (2003) and ACW (2006).
2.4. Analysis of the model dynamics
As in GH (2004), we assume that tari¤ revenues can be either consumed by the government (i.e.
Gt  0 for all t) or returned to households as transfers (i.e., Tt  0, for all t). And it is easy to verify
that the economy in which the government nances endogenous public spending and/or transfers
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with xed tari¤ rates is immune to indeterminacy. That is due to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the tari¤ rate is exogenous, production doesnt exhibit increasing returns to scale
since At term is a constant for all t. (In this case, government expenditures are endogenous under
the balanced budget rule.) Therefore, the economy exhibits saddle path stability, regardless of the
existence of lump-sum transfers.
GH prove that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, if the government nances
endogenous public spending and transfers with xed income tax rates, a one-sector real business cycle
model exhibits determinacy, regardless of the existence of lump-sum transfers. In our tari¤ model,
we have the same result. Once we x the tari¤ rate (or oil tax rate) like Miguel and Manzano (2006),
the model doesnt display increasing returns to scale, so indeterminacy cannot arise.
To remain comparable with SGUs analysis, we focus on the cases where the government either
consumes all tari¤ revenues (i.e., Tt = 0) or transfers the revenue to the household in a lump-sum
way (i.e., Gt = 0). In the following sections, we only discuss the case where Tt = 0 holds for all t.
Under this specic assumption, we replace the consumption with 1t and transform wage rate and
rental rate into functions of capital and labor, then the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to the
following ve equations
b = tanAtk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t , (14)
:
t
t
= +    akAtk
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t , (15)
:
kt = (1  a0
1 +  t
)yt   kt   1
t
 Gt, (16)
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Gt =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
, (17)
and
yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t . (18)
First we claim that for a given tari¤ rate (i.e.,  t =  , for all t), the dynamical system possesses
a unique interior steady state.
Lemma 2. The dynamical system possesses a unique interior steady state when the government
consumes all tari¤ revenues and the tari¤ rate is exogenously given, i.e.,  t =  , for all t. (In this
case, At = A() holds for all t.)
Proof. To nd such a steady state, set
:
t in (15) equal to zero. We can solve the capital/labor
ratio in the steady state, which is not independent of the tari¤ rate. ( kn)ss = (
+
akA
)
1 a0
 an is unique for
the given tari¤ rate. Equation (14) can be solved for a unique and positive value of  in the steady
state, i.e., ss = banA(
+
akA
)ak=an . Using this value of , the government budget constraint (17), and
the fact that in the steady state
:
kt = 0, we can write the market-clearing condition (16) as
(1  a0)kss[A(k
n
)
 an
1 a0
ss   ] = anA
b
(
+ 
akA
) ak=an . ((kss))
Since ( kn)ss is known given the tari¤ rate, we can nd that kss (the steady state value of the capital
stock) is unique and positive. Because both the capital stock and the capital/labor ratio are positive
and unique in the steady state, nss (the steady state value of the labor supply) is also positive and
unique. Finally, the steady state level of government purchases given by (17) is also unique and can
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be written as
Gss =

1 + 
a0Akss(
k
n
)
  an
1 a0
ss , ((g))
where kss is the solution to (kss) equation. It is clear that Gss is continuous in  .
It follows from (kss) and (g) that when  is equal to zero, Gss is also equal to zero because kss is
in this case positive and nite. If the tari¤ rate is exogenous, we can prove that there exists a unique
tari¤ rate that maximizes Gss. It is m = ana0 .
Secondly, for a given level of government expenditures, there is a (steady-state) La¤er curve-type
relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue, which means that the number of steady state
tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance the pre-set level of government purchases will be
general either 0 or 2. I prove it in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When tari¤rates are endogenously determined by a balanced-budget rule with a constant
level of government expenditures, the steady state in the dynamical system which consists of (14)-
(18) may exist and the number of steady state tari¤ rates ( ss) that generate enough revenue to
nance the pre-set level of government purchases will be general either 0 or 2. If two steady states
exist in the model, we only focus on the steady state associated with the low steady state tari¤ rate
since the steady state associated with the high steady state tari¤ rate is always deteminate.
Proof. We derive the steady state values of these variables kn = (
+
akA(ss)
)
1 a0
 an ,  = banA(ss)(
+
akA(ss)
)
ak
an
and k =
anA(ss)
b
( +
akA(ss)
)
  akan
[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] , where A( ss) denotes the steady state value of A as  t is equal to its
steady state value  ss. We also nd that in the steady state, G = ss
(1+ss)
an+a0
an
constant= F ( ss)
holds and the constant is
(
a0
po
)
a0
an a0(+)an(
+
ak
)
  akan
akb[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] . It is clear that F ( ss) is non-monotone and the
number of positive steady state tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance a pre-set level of
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government purchases will be general either 0 or 2.
Insert the gure
The second interesting nding is that if  is exogenous as we assume in the above lemma, @Gss@ = 0
implies that there exists a unique exogenous tari¤ rate that maximizes Gss. It is ana0 . This is due to
the fact that Gss is equal to 
(1+)
an+a0
an
constant.
In the third step, we show that when the government expenditures are exogenous, the tari¤ rate
is countercyclical with respect to the tax base or the output under the balanced budget rule. The
next proposition is the key to indeterminacy in my model.
Proposition 4. If the government expenditure is exogenous, the tari¤ rate is regressive with respect
to the tax base (poot), or the output under the balanced budget rule, i.e. @ t@yt < 0.
11 The regressive
(countercyclical) tari¤ rate (@ t@yt < 0) can induce increasing returns to scale with respect to capital
and labor.
Proof. po tot =  ta0yt(1+ t) = G implies that
@ t
@yt
< 0. Consider the log-linearization of the following three
equations around the steady state G =  ta0yt(1+ t) , At = (
a0
p0(1+ t)
)
a0
1 a0 , and yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t .
12 It is
easy to verify that
^
yt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt+
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
nt, which means that production exhibits increasing
returns to scale with respect to capital and labor, i.e., ak+an1 a0(1+ss) > 1. Thus, an endogenous tari¤
rate could be a source of scal increasing returns.
11This relation doesnt violate the evidence of a negative relationship between tari¤s and growth, especially among
the worlds rich countries like those in EU, which is documented by Dejong and Ripoll (2005).
12Log-linearizing the equation G = ta0yt
(1+t)
around the steady state, we have (G   a0yss) ^ t = a0yss ^yt and G =
ssa0yss
(1+ss)
, where
^
 t and
^
yt denote the log deviations of  t and yt from their respective steady states (i.e., ss and
yss). Combining these two equations yields
^
yt =   11+ss
^
 t. At = ( a0p0(1+t) )
a0
1 a0 implies that
^
At =   ss
^
t
1 a0
a0
(1+ss)
and log-linearizing the production function implies that
^
yt =
^
At +
ak
1 a0
^
kt +
an
1 a0
^
nt. It is straightforward to see that
^
yt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt +
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
nt.
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GH illustrate that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribes indeterminacy result depends on a balanced-budget requirement whereby the tax rate de-
creases with the households taxable income. In our model, we get a similar result that requires the
countercyclical rate to generate indeterminacy.13
To facilitate the analysis of the model dynamics, we consider the log linear approximation of the
equilibrium conditions around the steady state. Let t,
^
kt,
^
 t and
^
nt denote the log deviations of t,
kt,  t and nt from their respective steady states. The log linearized equilibrium conditions then are
0 = t    ss
^
 t
1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
+
ak
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt), (19)
:
t = (+ )[
an
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt) +  ss
^
 t
1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
], (20)
:
^
kt = [(1  a0) (+ )
1  a0(1 +  ss)   ]
^
kt +
an(+ )(1  a0)
ak[1  a0(1 +  ss)]
^
nt + [  + (1  a0)
ak
(+ )]t, (21)
and
^
yt =  
1
1 +  ss
^
 t =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt. (22)
Combining (19) and (22) yields
^
nt =
t
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
+
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt.
13We think that the progressive tari¤ rate may make the economy against the sunspots in ACW model.
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Using this expression to eliminate the
^
ntin (20) and (21) results in the following system of di¤erential
equations
2664
:
t
:
^
kt
3775 =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775
2664 t^
kt
3775 and J =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775 , (23)
where J11 =  ( + ) anak a0ss , J22 = ( + )
1 a0
ak a0ss   , J12 = ( + )
 ssa0
ak a0ss and J21 = ( +
) (1 a0)ak
1 (ss+1)a0
ak a0ss   . We can then compute the Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (23)
evaluated at the steady state. The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian are stated as follows
trace(J) =
ak
ak   a0 ss (+ )  , (24)
det(J) =
(+ )
ak   a0 ss f(an + a0 ss) 
(+ )
ak   a0 ss [an(1  a0)  a0 ss
1  a0
ak
(1  a0(1 +  ss))]g. (25)
Proposition 5. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the indeterminacy of the equilibrium is
J11 + J22 = trace(J) < 0 < J22J11   J12J21 = det(J), or, aka0 <  ss <  =
[(+)an(1 a0) anak]
[(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] .
Notice that since the dynamical system contains one predetermined variable, kt, the equilibrium
is indeterminate if and only if both eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real parts.
It is equivalent to requiring that the determinant be positive and the trace negative. It is easy to
verify that, trace(J) = akak a0ss ( + )    < 0 if and only if  ss >
ak
a0
. If the trace condition is
satised, the term (+)ak a0ss on the right side of the determinant is negative. det(J) > 0 if and only if
G( ss) = [
(+)a20(1 a0)
ak
+a20]
2
ss  ss[ (+)a0(1 a0)
2
ak
+a0(ak an)]+[(+)an(1 a0) anak] < 0. It is
easy to show G(aka0 ) = 0 and G(0) > 0. Then the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium
indeterminacy is equivalent to G < 0, or, aka0 <  ss < 
 where  = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] >
ak
a0
.
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A su¢ cient condition for the set of tari¤ rates satisfying the necessary and su¢ cient condition to
be nonempty is that the labor share is larger than the capital share (i.e., an > ak). For steady-state
tari¤ rates smaller than aka0 or greater than 
, the determinant of J is negative and therefore the
equilibrium is locally determinate. The thing that should be pointed out is that SGU show that the
revenue maximizing tax rate is the least upper bound of the set of taxes rate for which the rational
expectations equilibrium is indeterminate, but this property doesnt hold in our case.
The intuition behind the indeterminacy result is quite straightforward. Suppose that agents
expect future tari¤ rates to increase. This implies that, for any given capital stock, future oil
imports and the rate of return on capital will be lower (the latter is due to the fact that the marginal
product of capital is increasing in the oil input). The decrease in the expected rate of return on
capital, in turn, lowers the current oil demand, leading the current output decrease. Since the tari¤
rate is countercyclical @ t@yt < 0, budget balance can cause the current tari¤ rate to increase, thus
validating agents initial expectations. (For certain choices of the parameter values, namely those
satisfying aka0 <  ss < 
, the expectation of an above steady state tari¤ rate in the next period leads
to an increase in tari¤ rates today that is larger than the one expected for next period.)
To help understand the intuition, consider the consumption Euler equation (in discrete time for
ease of interpretation) as follows:
ct+1
ct
= (1   + ak yt+1
kt+1
) = [1   + (1 +  t+1) 
a0
1 a0 rbtt+1], (26)
where  denotes the discount factor, rbtt+1 = ak(
a0
p0
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t+1 n
an
1 a0
t+1 the before-tari¤ return on
capital and  t+1 the tari¤ rate in period (t + 1). Householdsoptimistic expectations that lead to
higher investment raise the left hand side of this equation, but result in a lower before-tari¤ return
on capital rbtt+1 due to the diminishing marginal products. The countercyclical tari¤ rate can increase
the right hand side of the equation, thus validating the initial optimistic expectations.
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Capital accumulation is crucial in generating indeterminacy in this economy. One can easily
show that in the absence of capital accumulation, the equilibrium is determinate. The reason is that
without capital, (14) becomes b=t = an( a0po(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 , (16) becomes 1=t = (1   a01+ t )yt  G, and
(17) becomes G=nt =  t( 1po )
a0
1 a0 ( a01+ t )
1
an . These three equations yield locally unique solutions for
 t, nt, and t.
We propose a numerical case based on ACW (2005) model without increasing returns: ak = 0:09,
an = 0:7, and ao = 0:21.14 We choose  = 0:1 for the depreciation rate and  = 0:04 for the discount
rate. These values are taken from SGU. Assuming that the steady state tari¤ rate in the country for
oil import is  ss = 0:6, then the two roots of the matrix J are  0:2250  1:5714i.15 Indeterminacy
arises due to the presence of endogneous tari¤ rates.16 The high tari¤ rate (0:6) is consistent with
the empirical data in those EU countries (especially in year 2002).
In a closely related paper, Chen and Zhang (2008) introduce intrinsic uncertainty in the form
of exogenous productivity and government purchases shocks into the discrete time version of this
model and investigate the propagation mechanism of sunspot and fundamental shocks under three
kinds of assumptions about their correlation. As in SGU, we calibrate the model and nd that (1)
under indeterminacy, the impulse responses of tari¤ rates, output, and hours to sunspot, technology
and government purchases shocks are hump-shaped and highly persistent; and (2) neither the rst-
order serial correlations, the contemporaneous correlations with output, nor the standard deviation
relative to output of tari¤s, output, hours, and consumption is a¤ected by the relative volatility of
the sunspot shock or its correlation with the technology shock. Therefore it validates the equivalence
between factor income taxes and tari¤s, in the sense that they share similar propagation mechanisms
14 In this numerical case, following ACW ( 2005), we set a0 to be 0:21 which is the cost share of foreign inputs in
domestic production in Netherlands.
15 import tari¤
import price =
15:6$=bbl
26$=bbl
= 0:6 is the optimal tari¤ rate of oil from Newbery (2005, section 3.1).
16One issue should be pointed out. Consumption taxes, which are a signicant source of tax revenue in the European
countries, are ignored. In fact, it can be shown that if the only source of government revenues is a tax on consump-
tion then the rational expectations equilibrium under a balanced-budget rule implemented through an endogenous
consumption tax rate is locally determinate.
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of sunspot and fundamental shocks.17
The conclusions in the model also hold for the energy taxes. As we see, the energy taxes as the
optimal tari¤ argument are relatively high in some European countries.18 For instance, oil is heavily
taxed in Denmark, the e¤ective tax rate on domestic fuels exceeds 0.8. It will push the Denmarks
economy into destabilizing easily. (Assuming that the time unit is a quarter, the capital share is 0.1
(i.e., ak = 0:1), the labor share is 0.7 (i.e., an = 0:7), the depreciation rate is 0.1 (i.e.,  = 0:1), the
discount rate is 0.04 (i.e.,  = 0:04) and the steady state oil tax rate is  ss = 0:8, indeterminacy
arises since two roots are 0:1667 1:1213i).19
3. Comparison with Benhabib-Farmer Model
In this section, we show that there exists a close correspondence between the indeterminacy condition
of the model with endogenous tari¤ rates and constant government purchases presented in my paper
and that of the increasing returns model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). That is, the necessary
condition for local indeterminacy is that the "equilibrium labor demand schedule" can be upward
sloping and steeper than the labor supply schedule. Unlike the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model,
my model doesnt rely on explicit increasing returns in production to make the equilibrium labor
demand be upward sloping. In fact, the equilibrium labor demand in my model can be upward
sloping because increases in the aggregate employment are accompanied by decreases in the tari¤
rate. The after-tari¤ labor demand function can be written (in log deviations around the steady
state) as
^
wt =
ak
1  a0
^
kt   ak
1  a0
^
nt   a0
1  a0
 ss
1 +  ss
^
 t, (27)
17The di¤erence is that in the calibration exercise, all parameter values are taken from ACW (2005).
18The energy tax revenue is overwhelmingly oil tax revenue in some EU countries, see Newbery (2005).
19The parameter values of ak and an are taken from ACW (2005). The values of  and  are taken from SGU.
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where
^
wt =
^bt
wt   a01 a0 ss1+ss
^
 t denotes the log deviation of the after-tari¤ wage rate from the steady
state.20 The rms labor demand schedule is decreasing in
^
nt. However, using the balanced-budget
equation (22) to eliminate
^
 t yields the following expression for the equilibrium labor demand sched-
ule:
^
wt =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
 (ak   a0 ss)
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt. (28)
As aka0 <  ss < 
, the equilibrium labor demand function is upward sloping since  (ak a0ss)1 a0(1+ss) > 0.
Because in our case
^
wt =
^
ct, the aggregate labor supply is innitely elastic (for a given tari¤ rate
and marginal utility of income), the labor demand schedule will be steeper than the labor supply
schedule whenever aka0 <  ss < 
. It is worth noting that our economy can be easily shown to be
equivalent to SGU model since in both cases, the price-to-cost markup is countercyclical with respect
to the output, which in turn gives rise to indeterminacy (see the appendix).
4. Comparison With SGU and WAC models
SGU prove that within a standard neoclassical growth model, a balanced budget rule can make
expectations of higher tax rates self fullling if the scal authority relies on changes in labor income
taxes to eliminate the short run scal imbalances. People will naturally think if the import factor
is a labor substitute, the endogenous tari¤ rate levied on the imported oil will make indeterminacy
arise more easily. Although in the above sections, we follow ACW to assume that the imported
factor is mainly a substitue for capital, we can not eliminate the possibility that imported factor is
a substitute for labor.
We get the following proposition:
20Here we should emphasize that
^bt
wt denotes the log deviation of the before-tari¤ wage rate from the steady state.
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Proposition 1. If we assume that the imported factor is mainly a labor substitute instead of a
capital substitute, which means that we x ak at a given level (say, ak = 0:3) and let a0 vary in the
interval (0; 1 ak an),21 indeterminacy may not easily arise under the labor substitute assumption.
Proof. First I give you an example. Let a0 be 0:2 as we did in the numerical case, and an be
0:5. The necessary and su¢ cient condition becomes aka0 = 1:5 <  ss < 
 = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] 
2:5. Consider the case which we analyzed before (the imported factor is a capital substitute, ak =
0:1, an = 0:7, and a0 = 0:2). The necessary and su¢ cient condition is
ak
a0
= 0:5 <  ss < 
 =
[(+)an(1 a0) anak]
[(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak]  3:5. Indeterminacy wont easily arise under the labor substitute assumption
since tari¤ rates cannot be that high (more than 150%). A simple proof can be stated as follows.
Consider an economy with capital share (a) and labor share (1 a). When we introduce into the model
the foreign input with share b as a labor substitute, the indeterminacy region becomes ab <  ss <
 = [(+)(1 a b)(1 b) (1 a b)a][(+)b(1 b)+ba] . When we introduce into the model the foreign input with share b as
a capital substitute, the indeterminacy region becomes a bb <  ss < 
 = [(+)(1 a)(1 b) (1 a)(a b)][(+)b(1 b)+b(a b)] .
It is clear that the lower bound of the region under the labor substitute assumption is larger than
the one obtained under the capital substitute assumption.
From this proposition, we nd that although tari¤s share the similar mechanism for indeterminacy
with factor income taxes, they have di¤erent implications in generating indeterminacy. That is, the
"equivalence" relationship between them only holds through scal increasing returns by endogenizing
rates and making the government spending exogenous. ACW nd that if the imported factor is a
substitute for labor, a larger oil share (a0) implies a smaller threshold value of the production
externality although the reduction of externality is less dramatic. Here we nd that for the same
oil share (a0), under the labor substitute assumption, the threshold value of the (steady state) tari¤
rate needed to generate indeterminacy (i.e., the lower bound of the indeterminacy region) can be
21Under the capital substitute assumption, we x an at a given level and let a0 vary in the interval (0; 1  ak   an).
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larger than the one obtained under the capital substitute assumption. In the numerical calibration
example of Chen and Zhang (2008), we assume that the time unit is a quarter, the capital share
is 0.09 (i.e., ak = 0:09), the labor share is 0.7 (i.e., an = 0:7), the depreciation rate is 0.025 (i.e.,
 = 0:025), the discount rate in the discrete time model is 0.99 (i.e.,  = 0:99) and the steady state
oil tax rate is 0.6 (i.e.,  ss = 0:6).22 Then we nd that indeterminacy arises in this case. We can
easily prove that indeterminacy disappears if we assume that the imported oil is a labor substitute.
Since ak = 0:3, a0 = 0:21, and an = 0:49 imply that indeterminacy would require the steady state
tari¤ rate be at least 10=7, the empirical tari¤ rate isnt in this region.
WAC show that heavy reliance on imported energy can have a signicant e¤ect on economic
instability in the presence of increasing returns to scale: the larger the imported energy share in
GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be subject to multiple equilibria. We have the similar
proposition below:
Proposition 2. We x an at a given level (say, an = 0:7), which implies that the imported input is
a capital substitute (i.e., ak + a0 = (1  an) is xed). The larger the imported energy share in GDP,
the easier it is for the economy to be subject to multiple equilibria. Because the lower bound of the
indeterminacy region aka0 <  ss < 
 = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0)+a0ak] decreases as a0 increases, indeterminacy
is easier to arise in the range of empirical tari¤ rates the larger a0 is.
As a0 decreases, the minimum tari¤ rate that generates indeterminacy increases (given that an
is xed). Some intuition for this result can be shown by considering the equilibrium condition in the
labor market. Suppose that expectations of a future tari¤ increase shift the labor supply schedule up
(since the rm will import more oil today to produce more output). Because the slope of the labor
demand schedule is equal to   ak1 a0 =   11+anak , the smaller ak is (given that an is xed), the larger
22The country in this example is Netherland and we assume that the foreign input is a capital substitute.
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the decline in employment (since the slope of the labor demand schedule decreases in absolute value
as ak decreases). Consequently, the increase in the tari¤ rate required to bring about budget balance
is larger the smaller ak is or the larger a0 is, and hence stationary sunspot equilibria become more
likely the larger a0 is.
5. Robustness
In this section, we briey discuss the robustness of indeterminacy in the economy with endogenously
determined tari¤ rates. Specically, we allow for income-elastic government spending and more
general preferences.23 First, we conclude that the more procyclical government expenditures are,
the less likely it is that indeterminacy arises. That is because GtYt =
a0
1+ 1
t
(the budget balance)
implies that the more countercyclical government expenditures are, the larger the required change
in tari¤ rates necessary to balance the budget for a given change in output, the more likely it is that
indeterminacy arises. Secondly, we claim that the larger the share of public expenditures nanced
by tari¤s, the more likely it is that indeterminacy arises. In a recent paper of Zhang (2008b), I
show that if Tt =
 ta0yt
(1+ t)
is exogenous (i.e., Gt = 0 the public expenditures nanced by tari¤s are
zero), indeterminacy still could arise but the lower bound of the indeterminacy region increases.
Thirdly, we can consider the general period utility function U(ct; nt) = log ct   n
1+
t
1+ ;   0 , which
implies less than perfectly elastic aggregate labor supply. In this case, the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply with respect to wage is equal to 1=. Like SGU, when we introduce a nontaxed sector (such as
home production) into the model, the balanced-budget rule may induce indeterminacy under realistic
tari¤ rates and labor supply elasticities. And indeterminacy is more likely the higher the Frisch labor
supply elasticity.
23As Jess Benhabib suggested to me, tari¤s and factor income taxes are very close to each other in nature. Tari¤s
can inherit many good characteristics of factor income taxes in the SGU model. So the method that I may use to
analyze how public debt and predetermined tax rates a¤ect indeterminacy can be similar to the one that SGU
used.
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6. Conclusion
We explore the "channel equivalence" between factor income taxes and tari¤s to generate indeter-
minacy. The channel is through scal increasing returns by endogenizing rates and making the
government spending exogenous. We show that, in the presence of scal increasing returns caused
by endogenous tari¤s, it is easy for indeterminacy to occur in small open economies that import
foreign energy and take as given the international energy price. The required steady state tari¤
rates can be empirically realistic. An implication of our paper is that economies largely dependent
on non-reproducible natural resources may be vulnerable to sunspot uctuations if the government
nances public spending with endogenous energy taxes.
One future task is to see under what circumstances, tari¤s and capital income taxes are equivalent
to generating indeterminacy since the essential element for indeterminacy in the SGU model is the
endogenous labor income tax rate.
7. Appendix:
We summarize the equilibrium conditions of the model with a balanced-budget rule, endogenous
tari¤ rates, and constant government purchases presented in this paper. Consider the discrete time
case of a tari¤. The balanced-budget rule is given by
G =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
.
The following equilibrium conditions hold for all t,
Uc(ct; nt) = t,
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Un(ct; nt) = wtt,
Yt = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt,
and
1 = 
t+1
t
(1   + rt+1),
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constaint of the agent. In my model, disposable
income, Yt; is given by
Yt = (1  a0)yt = yt   p0ot  G,
G represents a xed cost that ensures that rms do not make pure prots in the long run (given that
the foreign rms take away their payments). The after-tari¤ wage rate wt, and the after-tari¤ rental
rate rt are given by
rbtt = ak(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t = trt,
and
wbtt = an(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t = twt,
where rbtt and w
bt
t denote the before-tari¤ rental rate and before-tari¤ wage rate respectively. In the
balanced budget model, t represents the wedge between marginal product and after tari¤ factor
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prices introduced by endogenous tari¤s. It is easy to verify that the markup t is countercyclical
with respect to yt since
t = (1 +  t)
a0
1 a0 = (1  1  a0
a0
G
Yt
)
  a0
1 a0 = (
G
Yt
).
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